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HARMONIZING THE TENSION BETWEEN THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
PUBLICITY RIGHTS AND FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE: DISCERNING HOW
MUCH FREEDOM IS WARRANTED AND WHAT NEEDS PROTECTION
William F. Buchsbaum
Abstract
This paper examines the tension between the First Amendment and Publicity Rights
considering why and how friction is emerging, the legal underpinnings and theories behind the
development of publicity rights and how to reconcile this with values raised in support of the First
Amendment. This collision course of rights occurs where property interests have vested in human
identity itself which brings us face to face with the outer limits of free speech and expression under
the First Amendment and evens tests the notion of how we define speech. The paper takes a dive
into some of the currently arising issues with an eye towards future implications, and with concern
for the legal uncertainty resulting from the emerging tests being used, inconsistent case law, and
the overall landscape shaping this area of law.
INTRODUCTION
“Publicity rights”, is an area of the law that tests the very notion of how we define speech,
and brings us face to face with the limits of the First Amendment. Human identity itself has become
an intellectual property right that can be cultivated and exploited for better or worse and is deemed
worthy of protection. The development of publicity rights has interesting implications for the
future of the First Amendment. The Right of Publicity has its origins in privacy law but has actually
evolved into a property right and is recognized and treated as such.1 The Right of Publicity is state
based in the U.S.; currently 38 states have some common-law precedent, and 22 states have passed
some statute for right of publicity.2 The limits of what can receive publicity protection is currently
being pushed to explore far beyond mere basics such as name, likeness, and photographs. Now
things like costumes of movie stars, fictional character roles, individual pieces of clothing from
famous sports athletes, the human voice, catch phrases, paraphernalia, peculiar mannerisms, facial


Juris Doctor candidate, University of Cincinnati College of Law class of 2018; M.M., 2015, Miami University;
B.A., 2013, University of Cincinnati.
1
For more on the origins and evolution of publicity and privacy rights see Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis,
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193-199 (1890) (Warren and Brandeis were arguing for creation of
common law privacy rights and even described them in terms of property rights thus setting the stage for the later
creation of modern publicity rights: “[C]ommon law secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily,
to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others . . . by word or by signs, in
painting, by sculpture, or in music . . . the individual is entitled to decide whether that which is his shall be given to
the public.”) Id. at 198-99; see also William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 383-89 (1960) (later on Dean
Prosser discusses the Warren and Brandeis article and goes on to lay out 4 distinct kinds of privacy rights 1)
intrusion on one’s seclusion or solitude, 2) disclosing publicly embarrassing private facts, 3) publicity placing one in
a false light, and 4) appropriation of name or likeness); see also Dawn H. Dawson, The Final Frontier: The Right of
Publicity in Fictional Characters, U. ILL. L. REV. 635, 637-39 & n.11-12 (2001) (discussing how this fourth type of
privacy would actually evolve and distinguish itself from privacy to become a property right in publicity).
2
For an interactive map see, Statutes, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, http://rightofpublicity.com/statutes (last visited Mar. 28,
2018).
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characteristics, and digital avatars, to name but a few examples, are all potentially up for legal
protection as they can be found to conjure up the identities of individuals. All of this, and much
more, is on track for legal publicity protection. On the other end of the spectrum are those such as
advertisers and artists finding ways around restrictions and further testing the limits of what is
granted protection under the First Amendment, whether it is through morphing or distorting digital
images, using collage and panoramic techniques, disguising advertisements, blending art and
commercialism, blending film and advertisements, or using robot look-alikes in advertisements,
to name a few. Some argue for and others against the inevitable expansion of publicity rights and
whether this may come at a cost to First Amendment freedoms.3 The predominant problems here,
can be attributed to an underlying friction between certain freedoms guaranteed by the First
Amendment, and the more recently developing property right protections through publicity rights.
Friction emerges here along divergent lines of exploitation of human identity whether it is
for commercial or expressive purposes for example, and the value of such exploitation can be
implicated in some cases for good or ill; for the benefit of one or the detriment of another. This
friction becomes evident from the variety of tests with vague standards, inconsistent case results,
and confusion amongst circuit court rulings that have emerged to try to balance the interests and
values encompassing the First Amendment and the Right of Publicity. Overall, the attempts to
balance the competing interests and values have led to an atmosphere of legal uncertainty and
inconsistent results. This legal uncertainty, on its own, will likely lead to stifling of free speech,
expression, and artistic, social, and intellectual endeavors. The question then becomes, how to find
the right balance and approach towards protecting against wrongful exploitation of publicity rights
without stripping away free speech and stifling creativity. Neither free speech rights nor publicity
rights are absolute, but there are some unresolved gray areas and subtle tensions when they clash.

I.

BACKGROUND AND CURRENT PRACTICE

This section gives an overview of how the First Amendment and publicity rights come into
conflict and what creates this tension. This includes considering some of the specific philosophical
underpinnings and arguments that have been advanced as justification for the creation of and
enforcement of publicity rights which implicates some of the more overarching justifications for
the government placing limitations on freedom of speech and expression to this end. Looking at
the state of current practice will entail considering legal developments that have resulted in various
tests that have tried to reconcile and balance the inherently competing interests at stake here.
Finally, this section will conclude by looking at defenses and exceptions to publicity rights and
types of speech that receive protection. This article does not intend to explicitly advocate a rollback
of publicity rights or an expansion, but rather invites a discussion and look into why publicity
rights are necessary, consider arguments for and against pushing the rights in different directions,
See e.g. Linda J. Stack, White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.’s Expansion of the Right of Publicity:
Enriching Celebrities at the Expense of Free Speech, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1189, (1995); see also Jon Siderits,
Celebrities’ Expansive “Right of Publicity” Infringes upon Advertisers’ First Amendment Rights, 1 U. CIN. INTELL.
PROP. & COMPUTER L.J. (2016), available at http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/ipclj/vol1/iss1/4; see also Martin H.
Redish & Kelsey B. Shust, The Right of Publicity and the First Amendment in the Modern Age of Commercial
Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1443, 1447 (2015) (argues that “Today, courts routinely prioritize the pecuniary
interest in publicity rights over the First Amendment right of free expression.”).
3
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and ultimately move the discussion towards finding that ideal balancing test which has not yet
been crafted to deal with the issues and friction that inevitably arise.

A. The Unique Case for Having and Protecting Freedom of Speech, and Freedom of
Expression but Also Carving Out Publicity Rights – Having Our Cake and Eating It
Too
On the one hand are the important societal interests in having and protecting free speech
and expression as guaranteed under the First Amendment: “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
government for a redress of grievances.”4 On the other hand are rights which have developed and
vested in the commercial value of ones persona or identity. The Right of Publicity prescribes
liability to one who “appropriates the commercial value of a person’s identity by using without
consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade…” 5 This
Right of Publicity has developed in large part to prevent the unlawful commercial misappropriation
and infringement of one’s identity, particularly by advertisers who desire to use the identity of
famous athletes, celebrities, musicians, etc. to market their goods.6 Most cases of appropriation of
identity involve the commercial use of one’s name or likeness.7 However, indicia of identity can
include any number of things besides name or likeness, for instance, voice, signature, nickname,
certain traits or characteristics, mannerisms, and paraphernalia peculiar to a specific individuals.
Publicity rights do not simply end at a laundry list of enumerated categories, lest the next clever
advertiser comes along and thinks of some new way to get around that list.8 The trend, over time
and under current practice, is for publicity rights to protect means of evoking identity or persona
that are less and less obvious. Theoretically, anyone can invoke the Right of Publicity, whether a
person is a highly regarded and widely known celebrity or the most privately reserved individual;
any debate to the contrary is purely academic9 and not likely to see the light of day. However, in
reality it is most often celebrities who are the ones on the front lines bringing publicity claims.
Claims can be brought for infringement or misappropriation seeking remedies which include
injunction, damages, and punitive damages. In current practice, publicity rights survive death and
are generally descendible or assignable but the exact limitations on this will depend on the
jurisdiction. Historically, until the 1980’s only the four states of Florida, Oklahoma, Utah, and
4

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995); For various definitions of publicity rights see
Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125,
130 n.13-14 (1993) (“The right of publicity essentially gives a celebrity a legal entitlement to the commercial value
of her identity, thus enabling her to control the extent, manner, and timing of its commercial exploitation”).
6
McCarthy, J.T. & PM. Anderson, Protection of the Athlete’s Identity: The Right of Publicity, Endorsements and
Domain Names’, Marquette Sports Law Review, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 195 (2001).
7
See Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Maturation of an Independent Right Protecting the Associative
Value of Personality, 46 HASTINGS L. J. 853, 859 (1995).
8
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1988)(“It is not important how the defendant
has appropriated the plaintiff’s identity, but whether the defendant has done so . . . a rule which says that the right of
publicity can be infringed only through the use of nine different methods of appropriating identity merely challenges
the clever advertising strategist to come up with the tenth.”).
9
See Halpern, supra note 7 at 854.
5
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Virginia had a statutory right of survivability.10 But today, there is a wide range of how long
publicity rights survive, with some states granting it only for 10, 20, or 30 years past death, whereas
others go all the way up to 100 years or indefinitely.11

1. Having and Protecting Free Speech Under the First Amendment
The First Amendment and free speech serve many important functions and values which
are wrapped up in the human needs for identity, fulfillment, and self-expression.12 The prominent
First Amendment scholar Professor Emerson recognizes the importance of First Amendment
freedom for 4 primary values: 1) individual self-fulfillment, 2) advancing knowledge and truth, 3)
participation in decision for all members of society, and 4) creating a more adaptable and stable
community.13 This discussion necessitates a consideration of what types of speech the First
Amendment actually protects and how much protection is guaranteed. It is useful to frame the First
Amendment in a negative calculus.14 Firstly, freedom of speech and expression is not absolute
under the First Amendment.15 Freedom of speech “does not confer an absolute right without
responsibility”, or an “unbridled license” giving “immunity for every possible use of language”
and “prevent[ing] the punishment of those who abuse this freedom.”16 Certain categories of speech
are simply not protected in general under the First Amendment including obscenity, child porn,
and fighting words.17 Secondly, all other speech is potentially subject to regulation, restriction, and
limitations that can be imposed by the U.S. government in a variety of ways, for example, content
based restrictions and prior restraints.18 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has not entirely
foreclosed the possibility of recognizing additional categories of unprotected speech.19

10

Edward H. Rosenthal, The Right of Publicity 1, 7 (Aug. 2014),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/2015_intellectual_property_lit/mate
rials/the_right_of_publicity_article_rosenthal.authcheckdam.pdf.
11
Id. at 7-9.
12
Justice Brandeis says the goals of the First Amendment include 1) enlightenment, 2) self-fulfillment, and 3) the
safety valve see, Whitney v. California 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).
13
C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 946-1040 (1978) citing
prominent first amendment scholar Professor Emerson; see also Thomas I. Emerson, Toward A General Theory of
the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877-87 (1963); but see FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL
ENQUIRY, 19-29 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1982) (discussing how truth is defined, the survival theory of truth in the
marketplace of ideas, open discussion, and rational thinking as the goal rather than just knowledge).
14
See Ronald A. Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking: Constitutional Interpretation and Negative First Amendment
Theory, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1411-51 (1987) for a negative theory of the First Amendment and categories of
speech closer or further from its core concerns.
15
Id.
16
See Gitlow v. NY, 268 U.S. 666-667 (1925).
17
See generally, Kathleen Ann Ruane, Freedom of Speech and Press: Exceptions to the First Amendment, CRS
Report 95-815, (Sep. 2014), 1-35.
18
Id.
19
U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
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2. First Amendment Protection of Expressive versus Commercial Speech
One of the core issues debated in this arena of rights 20 is how to define expressive versus
commercial speech because it is not always clear cut and these different types of speech receive
different levels of protection under First Amendment precedent. The Supreme Court recognizes a
difference between commercial speech and expressive speech.21 “The First Amendment fully
protects expressive speech, including political speech, news and matters of public interest,
parodies, fictional works, artistic expressions, and cultural expression and recoding.”22 The First
Amendment grants less protection to commercial speech than expressive speech.23 But there is no
constitutional protection for false or misleading speech.24 The Supreme Court decision in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. New York provides the modern standard by which the government
can regulate speech found in commercial advertising contexts. The Court provides a four prong
analysis: 1) whether the speech at issue is lawful and not misleading, 2) whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial, 3) whether the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted, and 4) not more extensive than necessary to serve the governmental interest.25
Commercial speech at its core is actually quite limited; it is “speech that does ‘no more than
propose a commercial transaction.’”26 Even pure commercial speech at its core, receives some
protection – the free flow of information serves to enlighten public decision making.27
In examining “profit” and “for trade purposes” it is important to consider that just because
“books, newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them from
being a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment.”28 An area of
commonality in the jurisprudence has developed through a line of cases supporting the idea that
speech for profit does not lose constitutional protection.29 Profit is separable from commercial
exploitation and it is important to keep this distinction in mind. On the other hand, there is no
requirement that one must undertake an action for profit in order to invade the right of publicity.30
Rather, a person could invade another’s publicity rights intentionally or even unintentionally
without making any money at all and it is still an invasion.

See Baker, supra note 13 at 946-1040 (Baker proposes a “liberty model” in which free speech does not protect a
marketplace but instead protects “an arena of individual liberty from certain types of governmental restrictions.”).
21
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S 557 (1980).
22
Gloria Franke, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: Will One Test Ever Capture The Starring Role?,
79 S. CAL. L. REV. 945, 960 (2006).
23
See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. 557 at 563.
24
See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S.
626, 638 (1985).
25
See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. 557 at 564 (the government bears the burden of identifying and proving the
substantial interest).
26
Va. State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 n.24 (1976) (quoting
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)); but see Stephanie Marcantonio, What
is Commercial Speech? An Analysis in Light of Kasky v. Nike, 24 PACE L. REV. 357 (2003) (discussing some of the
difficulties and intricacies in defining Commercial Speech).
27
See generally, Va. State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748.
28
Time, Inc. v. Hill 385 U.S. 374, 397 (1967) (citing Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-502).
29
Id.; New Kids on the Block v. News America Pub., Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1540 (C.D. Cal. 1990); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
30
See generally, Franke, supra note 22.
20
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3. Carving Out Publicity Rights from the First Amendment
Going back to the 1950’s, Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. is often
claimed to be the case that established the modern Right of Publicity and for which the phrase
“Right of Publicity” has been coined.31 Baseball players gave consent to competing chewing gum
manufacturers to use their photographs in conjunction with the sale of gum.32 The court found that
“in addition to and independent of that right of privacy . . . a man has a right in the publicity value
of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture . . . .”33
Judge Frank wrote:
many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-players), far from having their
feeling bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely
deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing advertisements,
popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses,
trains and subways.34
This illustrates the basic justification for publicity rights which is distinct from privacy. People
have an interest in controlling and benefiting from their identity, likeness, or image (or any other
form of publicity-related property), hence a right to control how their likeness is displayed and
held out to the public, and an interest in receiving adequate compensation (weight is given to
economic incentives) for commercial exploitation of their property.
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. is the only Supreme Court case addressing
publicity rights.35 Zacchini involved a television station making an unauthorized broadcast of the
plaintiff’s 15 second “human cannonball” act.36 Hugo Zacchini spent much of his life pioneering
and perfecting his cannon-ball act. He did this for a living. In August of 1972, when he came to
Geauga County Fair in Burton, Ohio to perform, a free-lance reporter asked if he could record
Hugo; to which Hugo asked him to not record, as his performance was his livelihood.37 The
reporter came back the next day and hid in the crowd, made a 15 second recording, and it aired on
the 11 o’clock news.38 The Court held that the “broadcast of a film of petitioner’s “entire act”
poses a substantial threat to the economic value of that performance” and was a violation of the
plaintiff’s publicity rights.39 However, it has been pointed out that the Supreme Court may have
actually sidestepped the crux of the issue to some degree by producing this “entire act” standard.40
A performer’s entire act is possible the most clear cut example of a misappropriation. What more
is their left to misappropriate beyond a performers entire performance. What this framework
actually answers is very little if anything, and today there are much less obvious misappropriations
occurring than an entire performance. Furthermore, there are holes even in this approach because
31

Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
Id. at 866-68.
33
Id. at 868.
34
Id.
35
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1997).
36
Id. at 563.
37
Id. at 563-64.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 575.
40
See Halpern, supra note 7 at 867 (“[T]he Supreme Court has not dealt directly with a paradigmatic right of
publicity case.”).
32
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what about the time before and after the 15 seconds, including the fanfare and setting up for the
cannon blast, could this be part of the “entire performance”? Instead, courts have virtually ignored
this “entire act” approach and come up with different approaches.41 Zacchini demands a balancing
test42 but provides very little guidance which is evident from the panoply of tests emerging across
various courts. What we are left with is 50 state versions of the law and a few prominently
emerging Circuit court tests and lots of inconsistency.
In balancing publicity and First Amendment rights, it is also necessary to consider
that First Amendment guarantees of free speech serve two important purposes: first,
they advance knowledge and the search for truth by fostering a free marketplace of
ideas and an “uninhibited, robust, wide-open debate on public issues,” and second,
they fulfill the human need for self-expression and self-realization.43
In one sense, publicity rights can certainly take away and carve up tiny little slivers or
pieces of the First Amendment to be handed out as property for ownership. This is good in some
ways and not so good in other ways. What is not so good is that the effect of awarding ownership
rights to certain people would deprive others of access to those communicative resources, in some
instances even silencing speech in ways that could be deemed invasive or exploitative, or not
permissible. But publicity rights do not just take away from the First Amendment, they also give
back and help uphold the First Amendment in certain ways. The right to control one’s image that
is put out to the public has grounding and importance in helping achieve and protect certain First
Amendment values. The right to control one’s public image is tied to the ability to define oneself,
defining one’s identity through voluntary self-expression, achieving self-fulfillment through
meaningful participation (Edwin Baker gives an example of meaningful participation as protesting
the Vietnam War regardless of actually having an impact or changing anything), and selfrealization.44 Also implicated by this is one’s ability to control one’s identity and associations and
to communicate ideas to others about oneself. To misappropriate or trespass on someone’s right in
this regard is going to impede First Amendment values (image advertisers could just take anyone’s
image and slap it on a product). On the flip side, where speech is being silenced or pre-empted as
in the case of stylistic confinement,45 this will equally impede the First Amendment, but merely
on the opposite side of the equation.

B. Competing Interests and Rights at Stake When the First Amendment and Publicity Rights
Clash: Three Primary Brands of Argument Being Advanced to Justify Publicity Rights
Key to the First Amendment and publicity rights equation is seeing the two opposing sides
that crop up in the cases and the rationales underlying both. Typically, there will be the rights
holders, whether a living celebrity, or their heirs and estates and assignees. Their incentive is to
41

See infra Part II C for three of the emerging Circuit Court tests.
Thomas E. Kadri, Fumbling the First Amendment: The Right of Publicity Goes 2—0 Against Freedom of
Expression, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1519, 1522 (2014).
43
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis,
70 IND. L.J. 65-66 (1994).
44
See generally, C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1009-1040
(1978).
45
See infra Part III D on stylistic confinement.
42
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protect their property interest and maximize control or influence over the exploitation thereof to
their benefit or purpose. On the other side of the equation could be some other party or parties such
as companies, or artists, or the news media who seek to exercise their freedoms to exploit some
subject matter that is in question. Also, it’s important not to overlook the impact on the public in
general, even though typically not a party in the suit here. There are many good reasons, theories,
and philosophies underlying and supporting the Right of Publicity. There are three primary lines
of argument that are used in support of publicity rights which include economic, moral, and
consumer protection.46 Many tend to favor certain arguments here such as the economic ones while
giving short shrift to certain ones especially moral arguments, but it is important to not so quickly
write any of them off.
Moral arguments include rewarding labor and enjoying the fruits of one’s labor which is
rewarding the hard work, effort, time, resources, and skill one puts into something; conversely,
this includes preventing unjust enrichment whereby someone is unfairly reaping the benefits of
another intentionally or even unintentionally.47
Moral arguments can also encompass the ability to control one’s image and one’s
personhood, individual autonomy, personal dignity, preventing misrepresentation of values, and
preventing harm from association.48 Infringement or misappropriation can deprive one of the
choice of how to use or associate their image. People may be led to wrongly believe that one is
associated with some product or cause. Reputational damage could also be done through false or
misleading information. Some have pointed out emotional harms that can accompany
misappropriation of identity – misappropriation of identity can induce embarrassment,
humiliation, and mental distress.49 For example, in Grant v. Esquire Inc., the plaintiff was able to
recover for “lacerations to his feelings” after a magazine publisher superimposed Cary Grant’s
head on a clothing model’s torso.50
There are many economic reasons for supporting publicity rights including providing
incentives for socially useful activities and the creation of works and property, which benefit
society as a whole. There are both individual and societal benefits implicated by publicity rights.
Economic arguments also include economic efficiency in the face of resource scarcity, “avoiding
rent dissipation”, and avoiding waste.51
Finally, there are also consumer protection arguments which include guarding against
consumer confusion, preventing victimization of both the individual and the public from false
claims about products, and the public being misled about a “celebrity’s willingness to associate
himself with a product or service.”52 Consumer protection arguments are often considered weak
and there are other legal remedies and avenues already provided against such “deceptive trade
practices and unfair competition.”53
46

See generally, Redish & Shust, supra note 3 and Franke, supra note 22.
See Redish & Shust, supra note 3.
48
Id. at 1451-62.
49
See Dawson, supra note 1 at 646.
50
Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
51
See generally, Redish & Shust, supra note 3 at 1462-65.
52
Id. at 1466.
53
Id.
47
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Overall, there is a combination of sound reasoning, strong grounds, and many proponents
for having and enforcing publicity rights. However, there are criticisms, counterarguments and
even potential holes in some of these theories; theories which favor the development of publicity
rights. There is not enough room here to explore them all save one or two. Fame is not in truth,
contingent on one’s hard work, effort, skill, or time, and one cannot make oneself famous, but is
instead a “relational phenomenon” conferred by others.54
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as
diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to remove governmental
restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views
shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such
freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity
and in the belief that no other approach would comport with the premise of
individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rest.55
The primary theories and justifications for publicity theories fail to account for the
audience. Without the audience, there would be no publicity to begin with. Furthermore, is there
truly no value in their reception of the information, whether it is for humor or decision making? A
whole host of potential holes is exposed by consumer protection arguments particularly because
other avenues may already be available as solutions including likelihood of confusion, false light,
false endorsement, and no constitutional protection for false or misleading speech.
C. No Clear Winner in Sight – Inconsistent Tests Emerging to Bring Balance to the Chaos
Many are identifying problems with the current practice for publicity rights. For instance,
one major problem is the failure of states to develop tests that are consistent and effective to
safeguard freedom of speech.56 Some are even proposing the creation of a federal statute for the
right of publicity as a solution to address problems in current practice.57 As a result of the vague
demands for a balancing test from the Supreme Court in Zacchini, there is much lower court
confusion and chaotic application, with circuit courts coming out different ways and promulgating
different tests and approaches. Many of these have been rejected but a few have come to
prominence including 1) the Transformative Use Test, 2) the Rogers Test, 3) the Predominant Use

Mark S. Kontopoulos, The Right of Publicity, Morality and Free Speech: An ‘Uneasy’ Relationship (April 2002)
(dissertation, KENT LAW SCHOOL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LW 556) at 11, available at
https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.kent.ac.uk%2Flaw%2Fip%2Fresources
%2Fip_dissertations%2F2001-02%2FDiss-Kontopolous.doc.
55
See Cohen v. Cal., 403 U.S. 15 (1972).
56
Susannah M. Rooney, Just Another Brown Eyed Girl: Toward A Limited Federal Right of Publicity Under the
Lanham Act in a Digital Age of Celebrity Dominance, 86 S. CAL. L. REV 924 (2013); see also Franke, supra note
22.
57
Id. at 921-958 (proposing a federal right of publicity under the Lanham Act).
54
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Test.58 Furthermore, these tests are being criticized for vague standards and inconsistent
application.

1. Transformative Use Test
The governing test for California, which is being adopted increasingly outside
California,59 was promulgated in Comedy III Productions v. Gary Saderup, Inc.60 Under Comedy
III, First Amendment protection is limited to works that are transformative and the court conducts
a test relying on at least five factors.61 The Transformative Use Test includes the following five
factors and is perhaps the closest to an ideal test so far but not yet perfect enough to be accepted
everywhere universally:
1) the celebrity likeness is one of the raw materials from which an original work
synthesized; 2) the work is primarily the defendant’s own expression if the
expression is something other than the likeness of the celebrity; 3) the literal and
imitative or creative elements predominate in the work; 4) the marketability and
economic value of the challenged work derives primarily from the fame of the
celebrity depicted; and 5) an artist’s skill and talent has been manifestly
subordinated to the overall goal of creating a conventional portrait of a celebrity so
as to commercially exploit the celebrity’s fame.62
The Transformative Use Test most importantly asks whether one has put their own creativity into
the work and looks at the sum of the parts. This test could be likened to a fine brush stroke
approach that is very much dependent on the technique of the artist or the expressive content; it
looks at what sets the new work apart from the original likeness, including considering what parts
are literally borrowed or imitated versus which parts are something truly of the defendant’s own
creative expression. This is somewhat like a test of originality and the test appears to treat the said
likeness in question as if it were some piece of artwork. And yet this test has received a lot of
scholarly criticism and many have dubbed it as “unworkable” due to problems with application
and interpretation even within its inception to the case Comedy III from which it came – the test
seems to borrow from copyright law and the definition of fair use.63 The test provides a good
58

Ronald S. Katz, When Rights of Publicity Trump First Amendment, LAW360, (May 22, 2013, 1:06 PM)
https://www.law360.com/articles/444030/when-rights-of-publicity-trump-1st-amendment (more than half a dozen
tests have been used to balance the First Amendment and publicity rights).
59
Michael Davis-Wilson, Publicity rights vs. the First Amendment, FENWICK.COM, (Feb. 19, 2014),
https://www.fenwick.com/publications/pages/publicity-rights-vs-the-first-amendment.aspx.
60
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
61
See Franke, supra note 22 at 971 (contending the lack of one clear definition and the vague standard created by
the transformative use test chills free speech).
62
Comedy III v. Saderup, 21 P.3d 797 at 808.
63
See Franke, supra note 22 at 970-74. (discussing the Transformative Use Test and drawing on many of its
scholarly criticisms, how it lacks a clear definition, has proven extremely vague in application through inconsistent
court holdings, how it encourages judges to be art critics and other flaws underlying the logic of protecting
transformative works but not protecting non-transformative works). For further criticism of the test see also, Doe v.
TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (in which the Supreme Court of Missouri argues the Transformative
Use Test overextends First Amendment Protection).
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foundation and starting point for sorting out whether and how a celebrity likeness is indeed being
exploited through factors one, two, and three, and for considering to what end the likeness is
being exploited through factors four and five. But, this test leaves much unanswered concerning
what speech ultimately should and should not be protected under the First Amendment.

2. Rogers Test
The Sixth Circuit is the only circuit to adopt the Rogers Test (also called the Relatedness
Test or the Restatement Test) for the publicity arena and it has been used inconsistently therein.64
The test derives from the case Rogers v. Grimaldi in which the famous actress Ginger Rogers sued
the film producers and distributors of “Ginger and Fred” which was a film about the dancing
career of two fictional Italian cabaret performers who imitated Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire her
frequent onstage partner.65 The Rogers Test aims to prevent consumer confusion: step 1) is
determining whether use of name or likeness is at least minimally relevant to the underlying work
– if the answer is no then no First Amendment protection, if yes then move on to step 2) which is
determining whether the work is simply a disguised advertisement – if yes then there is no First
Amendment protection.66 In Rogers v. Grimaldi, the Sixth Circuit found the film was protected.67
The key language for the first part of this test is “minimally relevant.” Like the previous
Transformative Use Test, this language is useful in discerning the purpose of a celebrity
invocation. This test brings something different to the table in that it appears to focus more on the
aspect of “use” and to what “degree.” This test raises the importance of relevance and degree of
the use. Step two really hits hard against a nature of use being that of disguised advertising.
Moreover, the test considers how the likeness is being used.
The Third Circuit has rejected and criticized the Rogers Test as subjective and arbitrary
contending it calls on judges to act as impartial jurists and discerning art critics.68 But this test
leaves unanswered much, even regarding use, including what uses are permissible and protected
versus which ones are not except for the explicitly stated category of disguised advertisements.

3. Predominant Use Test
The Predominant Use Test originated from a law review article by Mark Lee and has been
adopted in particular by the Third Circuit.69 The Third Circuit gave a recent illustration of the test
in Hart v. Electronic Arts Inc.:

64

Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003) which adopted the Rogers Test for a publicity dispute; but
see ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub.’g. Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) which acknowledges Parks but does not apply the
Rogers Test to the publicity claim at issue).
65
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2nd Cir. 1989).
66
Id. at 996-97.
67
Id. at 1005.
68
See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3rd Cir. 2013) (the third circuit rejected the Rogers and Predominant
Use Tests in favor of the Transformative Use Test for this case).
69
Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of Publicity-Free Speech Interface, 23
LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471 (2003); see also Redish & Shust, supra note 3 at 1476.
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If a product is being sold that predominantly exploits the commercial value of an
individual’s identity, that product should be held to violate the right of publicity
and not be protected by the First Amendment, even if there is some ‘expressive’
content in it that might qualify as ‘speech’ in other circumstances. If, on the other
hand, the predominant purpose of the product is to make an expressive comment
on or about a celebrity, the expressive values could be given greater weight.70
The test essentially looks to what the primary purpose of the use is; whether this is to merely
exploit the likeness of another, or whether the purpose was expressive instead; requiring a
weighing of the purpose to determine whether commercial exploitation or expression
predominates. This test recognizes the potential for expressive content in a product and the
possibility for multiplicity in speech purpose here, particularly the possibility of speech being a
mixture of simultaneous commercial exploitation and expression. But this test is tackling the issue
from a much more broad-brush stroke than the other approaches, if the intention is to make an
expressive comment, then it may get protection. It all hinges on how to interpret “expressive
comment” and whether the speech falls inside the interpretation of “expressive comment” or not.
This leads right back to what constitutes expression and what constitutes mere commercial and
exploitative speech. This also begs the more important and illusive question (at least from a
negative First Amendment calculus perspective) of what qualifies as not an expressive comment.
What about purely factual information? Certainly, determining the true purpose of the speech here
and whether it is predominantly exploitative in a bad way (especially commercially) is important
in the sum total of this inquiry but this approach leaves many questions unanswered and
unsatisfactory.
D. Lines of Defense and Exceptions to Publicity Rights – Speech Deemed Worthy of
Protection and the Need for Freedom
Celebrity control and publicity rights cannot be absolute71 and there are several lines of
defenses that have been created. Not all the defenses will be mentioned here but it is important to
highlight briefly a few of them. Lines of defense have and must be brought including, matters
that are newsworthy or of legitimate public concern, parody, and many states are developing
varying public interest exceptions, there is also much First Amendment protection being
garnered for literary and artistic works.

1. Newsworthy and Legitimate Public Interest
Despite the different paths courts are taking with the various emerging tests to handle issues
of publicity rights, there are some areas of commonality being developed in the law and in
particular along the lines of defenses. Courts are increasingly embracing exceptions for matters
that are 1) newsworthy or 2) matters of legitimate public concern.72 There is great importance for
70

See Hart v. Elec. Arts, 717 F.3d 141 at 154.
Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
72
Allen Rostron, The Mugshot Industry: Freedom of Speech, Rights of Publicity, and the Controversy Sparked by an
Unusual New Type of Business, 90 WASH. U.L. REV. 1329-30 (2013).
71
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establishing and developing lines of defense along these avenues because it affects the very flow
of information in a democracy and informed public decision making. Inadequate access to
information, would likely disserve the public as a general matter.
The precious little freedom that is granted under these avenues is counterbalanced in some
ways for instance there is a privacy tort that has developed called “false light” that is closely related
to defamation that can be brought where 1) published information casts a person in a false light,
2) is highly offensive to a reasonable person, and 3) is published with knowledge or reckless
disregard of the falsity.73 This covers embellishment, distortion, stock footage in a news story, the
addition of false material, disguised fictional references to real people.74 However, some courts
consider works of fiction constitutionally protected even if they resemble clearly identifiable
people.75 Generally, information that is deceptive, false, or misleading is not going to be
constitutionally protected under the First Amendment.76

2. Parody
Parody has been established as a major defense in the realm of intellectual, against publicity
rights, and against libel and defamation.77 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players’
Ass’n, is the case that established parody as a major defense against publicity rights.78 Cardtoons
dealt with trading cards featuring humorous major league baseball player caricatures ridiculing the
players in many ways including their physical characteristics, egos, and compensation.79 The court
in Cardtoons exemplifies the societal and First Amendment importance of Parody:
A parodist can, with deft and wit, readily expose the foolish and absurd in society.
Parody is also a valuable form of self-expression that allows artists to shed light on
earlier works and, at the same time, create new ones. Thus, parody, both as social
criticism and a means of self-expression, is a vital commodity in the marketplace
of ideas.80
Parody is worthy of First Amendment Protection and is an area that should not be carved up by
Publicity Rights but rather the freedoms associated with parody should be strongly preserved
because parody is so valuable. Parody is a powerful and healthy outlet and public vehicle for
73

For a brief description of false light compared to other types of misappropriation see Reporters Committee for
Freedom for Freedom of the Press, False Light – Misappropriation – Right of Publicity, RCFP.ORG,
http://rcfp.org/first-amendment-handbook/false-light-misappropriation-right-publicity (last visited Mar. 25, 2018).
74
Id.
75
Polydoros v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 965 P.2d 724 (Cal. 1998), aff’g 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1997).
76
See supra note 24.
77
See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (“Under the free speech guaranties of the Federal
Constitution’s First Amendment, public figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress by reason of publications caricaturing them unless they show . . . a false statement of
fact which was made with actual malice.”).
78
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players’ Ass’n 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).
79
Id.; Ku, Raymond Shih Ray, Is Nominal Use An Answer to the Free Speech & Right of Publicity Quandary?:
Lessons from America’s National Pastime, 11 CHAPMAN L. REV. 435 (2008): 440-42, available at
http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/131.
80
Cardtoons, 95 F.3d 959 at 972.
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expression, criticism, and new ideas. Some counter arguments against parody can include whether
there is any serious reputational or emotional damage done to whoever is being parodied, and how
is too far to extend parody protection, certainly there must be limits to what is parody.

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Inconsistent Results Commercially Exploiting Name or Likeness: A Tale of Kings and
Parks
The Georgia Supreme Court in Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change v.
American Heritage Products recognized a “celebrities right to the exclusive use of his or her name
and likeness” holding that the First Amendment did not protect the right to manufacture and sell
plastic busts of public figure and civil rights hero Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.81 Contrast this with
a more recent case in 2016, Rosa & Raymond Parks Inst. For Self Dev. V. Target Corp in which
the Eleventh Circuit held Michigan publicity rights cannot prevent a store from selling movies,
books, and plaques in honor of Rosa Parks because such activities are protected by First
Amendment free speech guarantees.82 What is in common with both of these cases is that they
both involve historical public figures (civil rights icons even) who were not public officials but
rather private individuals, whose publicity rights survived them and passed along to their estates.
However, both cases came out quite differently.
The Supreme Court of Georgia in Martin Luther King v. American Heritage held that
publicity rights do in fact survive death (this follows the trend mentioned earlier), also that they
need not be commercially exploited by a person in order to be protected.83 However, the court left
unclear and un-fully answered how to define commercial exploitation and the analytical
framework for determining whether there is commercial exploitation.84 What happened was the
defendant hired an artist and sold around 200 busts of Dr. King; the defendant used his company
B & S Sales to manufacture which would merge with his newly created B & S Enterprises which
was created to sell the busts, all allegedly in Dr. King’s honor.85 The Defendant took out two
magazine advertisements, held his work out as an “exclusive memorial” and “an opportunity to
support the Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change”, and testified that he set aside 3%
of each sale (roughly $30 purchase price) for the Center in a trust fund which would send them the
money.86 The magazine advertisements also offered a free booklet about the life of Dr. King titled
“A Tribute to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.”87 He also published a brochure or pamphlet which was
inserted in 80,000 copies of newspapers around the country which restated the same things covered
in the magazine advertisements, and contained photographs of Dr. King and excerpts from his
copyrighted speeches.88 Although Dr. King never commercially exploited his own image himself

81

Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change v. American Heritage Products, 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982).
Rosa & Raymond Parks Inst. For Self Dev. V. Target Corp, 812 F.3d 824 (11th Cir. 2016).
83
See Martin Luther King v. American Heritage, 296 S.E.2d 697 at 705-06.
84
Id. at 697-706.
85
Id. at 698-99.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
82
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during his lifetime, his image has often been commercially exploited by others, he was a Baptist
minister by profession, and perhaps doing so would have impeded his ministry.89
Ultimately, the court found in favor of the plaintiffs, who collectively owned the publicity
rights of Dr. King, but I suspect the court was grappling with how to define commercial
exploitation even struggling with the subtle tension here between the emerging publicity rights
jurisprudence and First Amendment implications. Justice Weltner’s partial concurrence and partial
dissent is illustrative of a few interest points of this struggle:
[M]ajority says that the fabrication and commercial distribution of a likeness of Dr.
King is not “speech,” thereby removing the inquiry from the ambit of the first
Amendment or Free Speech inquiry . . . When our Constitution declares that anyone
may “speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects” it does not confine
that freedom exclusively to verbal expression. Human intercourse is such that at
times the most powerful of expressions involve no words at all . . . . Are not the
busts of former chief justices, stationed within the rotunda of this very courthouse,
expression of sentiments of gratitude and approval?90
Justice Weltner also raises hypothetical and even real-life art examples including a Portrait of Dr.
King that was hung in the State Capital, further how this case could be resolved in terms of being
unjust enrichment, and yet how financial gain cannot be the ultimate dividing line, instead we must
look to community judgment of what ex aesquo et bono, is unconscionable.91
In sharp contrast, the Eleventh Circuit in Rosa & Raymond Parks v Target would go on to
hold that a commemorative plaque and several other products honoring Rosa Parks all can be sold
by Target, a national retailer under First Amendment protection.92 The Eleventh Circuit established
what some could call a new public interest test. Concerning the collage style plaque which placed
an image of Parks next to an image of Dr. King, the court considered the plaque itself as art and
noted how public interest extends not only to sharing historical and educational information, but
also entertainment, and amusement even when that interest conflicts with a right of publicity.93
Furthermore, the court noted the historical significance of Rosa Parks’s image for Civil Rights and
how sharing history is in the general public’s interest.94
Another case, ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003), invoked
Ohio common law publicity rights and was a First Amendment win for an artist upholding his First
Amendment rights to sell prints of a painting depicting world famous golfer Tiger Woods in his
1997 Masters Tournament victory.95 The painting was a collaged styled work depicting Woods in
a panorama of different poses and the artist sold around 5000 prints of the work. 96 This was not a

89

Id. at 700.
Id. at 708.
91
See Martin Luther King v. American Heritage, 296 S.E.2d 697 at 708-09.
92
See Rosa & Raymond Parks v. Target, 812 F.3d 824 at 827-32.
93
Id. at 830-32.
94
Id. at 831.
95
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 918-919 (6th Cir. 2003).
96
Id.
90
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parody at all but more along the lines of a serious portrait and depicting Tiger Woods doing what
he performs for a living even, and this was a win for works of art under the First Amendment.
In the case of Parks v. LaFace Records, the music group Outkast released an album titled
“Aquemini” containing a song titled “Rosa Parks” which garnered Billboard Chart success and
helped the group land a Grammy nomination.97 The chorus of the song contained the phrase “move
to the back of the bus” in reference to her brave historical act of refusing to give up her bus seat to
a white passenger. Rosa Parks brought suit over the use of her name without her consent however
the case would ultimately get settled.98 The case raises the issue of using someone’s name as the
title of a musical work and it would have been interesting to see the outcome had the case been
pursued.
Martin Luther King v. American Heritage, highlights the struggle going on here, the same
issues that the court was struggling with back in the 1980’s are still the same issues underlying the
more recent cases. The framework and analysis for determining what constitutes “commercial
exploitation” versus what constitutes protected free speech has been left ambiguous and not
satisfactorily filled in for how courts should arrive at that. Instead, each state or Circuit Court is
doing its own thing and while there may be areas of common development, there are also areas of
stark contrast.
B. Expressive Speech and Commercial Speech Dichotomy – A Key Factor For
Harmonizing the Inherent Tension Between the First Amendment and Publicity Rights
Gloria Franke points out one of the key issues that is creating tension between the First
Amendment and Publicity Rights which is giving courts such trouble in trying to find a resolution.
What is problematic is that speech can be both commercial and expressive at the same time or
contain elements of both simultaneously.99

1. Recognizing Speech with Commercial and Non-commercial Elements: Speech with
Dual Roles
The court in Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., finds and discusses a dual role of speech
found in a store advertisement containing a letter honoring the famous basketball player Michael
Jordan yet also calculated to the financial gain of the store.100 When Michael Jordan was inducted
into the Naismith Memorial Basketball Hall of Fame in 2009, Time, Inc. the publisher of Sports
Illustrated ran a commemorative issue, they offered Jewel Food Stores which operated 175
supermarkets in and around Chicago a free advertising space in the magazine in exchange for
stocking the magazine in store.101 Jewel accepted and published a one page letter in honor of
Michael Jordan which showed an image of his shoes with the distinctive number 23 which is
97

Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 347, 441-444 (6th Cir. 2003).
Id.; LaFace Records v. Parks, 540 U.S. 1074 (2003) (cert. denied).
99
See Franke, supra note 22 at 960-961.
100
Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2014).
101
Id. at 511.
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Michael Jordan’s number and also featured prominently the “Jewel-Osco” logo.102 The court found
a dual role here and weighed in favor of plaintiff Michael Jordan; that the commercial elements
outweighed the expressive speech.103 In this case, the problem with the speech was that the
commercial purpose was deemed to be for general brand promotion or brand loyalty. This is more
abstract than the core of commercial speech which is nothing more than to propose a commercial
transaction. In fact, in this case there was absolutely no transaction implied or suggested for buying
any products, but since the purpose can be found to be towards general brand promotion then that
purpose outweighs the free speech under the court’s analysis.104 The store was deemed to have
been free-riding on the Michael Jordan’s goodwill and lost.105 The court found that the Bolger
framework applies because this is speech containing commercial and non-commercial elements.106
The Bolger inquiry asks: 1) whether the speech in question is in the form of an advertisement, 2)
refers to a specific product, 3) has an economic motive.107 The court also goes on to discuss the
“inextricably intertwined principle” which applies only when “it is legally or practically
impossible for the speaker to separate out the commercial and non-commercial elements of his
speech”, but as in this case – simply combining elements of commercial and non-commercial is
not enough to transform the whole thing into non-commercial speech.108 These principles all very
much relate back to the concept of disguised advertising, and this test is useful solving the
commercial expressive dichotomy because it recognizes the mixture and variation of commercial
and non-commercial elements and how they can be at times inseparable.

2. Problems Underlying Commercial Speech Rationales
Courts have to draw lines somewhere and this question of where to draw the line is breeding
tension. How far can we take this idea of commercial exploitation and stretch its application before
it rips; before it becomes a paradigm for celebrity censorship? Michael Madow raises many
important points about the expressive, communicative, and symbolic power behind celebrities and
our use of them in even our daily speech:
Entertainment and sports celebrities are the leading players in our Public Drama . .
. We copy their mannerisms, their styles, their modes of conversation and
consumption. Whether or not celebrities are “the chief agents of moral change in
the United States,” they certainly are widely used . . . to symbolize individual
aspirations, group identities, and cultural values. Their images are thus important

Id. An interesting side issue to consider is how Michael Jordan’s shoes are a much less obvious means of
evocation than many other means putting aside any invocation of Jordan’s name or any of the text in the message;
Jordan was effectively invoked through a pair of sports shoes with his number. Does this grant a monopoly on this
sport plus shoe plus number combination? Potentially yes.
103
See Jordan v. Jewel, 743 F.3d 509 at 518-21.
104
Id. at 518.
105
Id. at 518-19.
106
Id.
107
See U.S. v. Benson, 561 F.3d 718, 725 (7th Cir. 2009).
108
See Jordan v. Jewel, 743 F.3d 509 at 521.
102
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expressive and communicative resources: the peculiar, yet familiar idiom in which
we conduct a fair portion of our cultural business and everyday conversation.109
If lines are drawn too tightly, then access to powerful communicative resources including
references to celebrities will be non-existent, on the other hand, if lines are too loosely drawn, then
celebrities will not have enough control over their own images and incentives to create will also
diminish. Therefore, a balancing is needed.
Another issue underlying commercial speech is that sometimes the court will side step the
Central Hudson Test. In his scathing dissent in White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc. Justice Kozinski
wrote: “The Supreme Court didn’t set out the Central Hudson test for its health” when the Court
acknowledged the test in that case but never even applied it.110 Hence, while commercial speech
protection may get recognition at times, this is not the same as application and protection.
Martin Redish and Kelsey Shust raise a host of other key issues and problems pertaining
to the rationales underlying commercial speech doctrine under First Amendment jurisprudence in
particular they attack analysis based on the speaker’s motivation.111 In their analysis of how the
jurisprudence is operating, they note that the “subject or content of the expression in question” is
treated as irrelevant to the commercial expression dichotomy drawn by the Supreme Court.112
Furthermore, they critique and reject the theories and suggestions of Robert Post specifically that
-“commercial speech cannot be deemed protected ‘public discourse’ because it ‘should be
understood as an effort . . . simply to sell products’ and not as an effort ‘to engage public opinion’”
- and contend that this such line of inquiry is based on “speaker motivation”.113 They argue that
analysis premised on “speaker motivation” is “sorely misguided” and rather that “the value of an
expression’s receipt” is more important.114

109

See Madow, supra note 5 at 128; see also RICHARD SCHICKEL, INTIMATE STRANGERS: THE CULTURE OF
CELEBRITY IN AMERICA 29 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1985) (calling celebrities as “chief agents of moral
change”).
110
See White v. Samsung 989 F.2d 1512, 1520 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see infra Section III C discussing
Evocation and Samsung.
111
See Redish & Shust, supra note 3 at 1483-88.
112
Id. at 1485-86 (“But if value lies in the receipt, then what possible difference can the speaker’s motivation make?
Whether the speaker is Mother Theresa, Standard Oil, or Darth Vader, the information and opinion conveyed can
play an equally legitimate role in shaping the citizenry’s views, thoughts, and positions and, in so doing, further the
democratic system’s operation and the individual citizens’ intellectual growth.”).
113
Id. (citing Robert Post see Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1.
18 (2000).
114
Id. at 1485-88.
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3. Building a New Test That is More Evenly Balanced to Measure Commercial
Exploitation Will Require Recognizing Variation and Overlap of Expressive and
Commercial Speech Purposes
This paper does not intend to solve the dilemmas posed here as many have tried already,
but rather suggest a direction. There needs to be some test that is capable of digging in to more
successfully divide expressive speech from commercial speech both recognizing and considering
all manner of mixtures and variation therein. This is no easy task and is plain from the attempts
that have already been made, but it is essential to helping find a balance for the tension here.
The interest in protecting the expressive speech should be weighed against the harm or loss
done from the commercial exploitation of one’s property. The analysis could perhaps be factorial
building off the direction of the transformative use test as well as taking some ideas from the other
two circuit tests mentioned. The analysis should take into consideration at least the overall context
of the misappropriation (whether its art, or history, or communication of ideas, news, etc. to answer
the important question of whose and what kind of property are we dealing with), the intent or
purpose (how and why is the property we are dealing with being used, whether for commercial
transactions and advertising or for expressing ideas or even multiple purposes), and means
employed for the exploitation, the results and how damaging the actions actually ended up. Taking
into consideration just the intent or purpose is not going to tell the whole story under any
framework or analysis. On the other hand, it might not be practically useful to just ignore intent
and purpose where it can be established or demonstrated. Motivation can inform on whether the
exploitation was with good or ill intentions. However, the value of the speech may have to be
divorced from the intentions for purposes of protecting the speech so long as it does not fall within
any of the unprotected categories.
The purposes for which the property is being exploited must ultimately be weighed and not
simply ignored and this gets right to the heart of the expressive commercial speech dichotomy.
Speech purposes can be identified and overlap here or even be ambiguous. In considering the
means employed for exploitation, were the means involved in the exploitation very minimal, or
rather extreme; this would involve considering what elements were taken from the original image
literally, versus what was combined and synthesized with newly created elements – the degree of
copying, the relevance of the elements to evoking the image or likeness in question. Furthermore,
it should be factored in whether a reasonable person would intelligibly and reasonably find the
usage to evoke the particular person whose identity has been infringed.
Considering the means employed will also lead to finally consider how much property
exploitation could have reasonably been causally expected. The potential for any alternative means
might also be considered including whether the content of the expression is perhaps so tightly
coupled with the means of saying it that it would be inseparable and practically impossible to
express in any other way for instance. For example, in making a joke or parody, inevitably there
must be some kernel of truth that is so inseparable and necessary for the audience to be able to
identify who the joke is about.
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C. Dangerous Stretching of “Evocation Analysis” Under Samsung – The Problem With
“Anything Goes”115
Another foreseeable problem and potential area for friction, arises from White v. Samsung
Elec. Am., Inc. in which Justice Kozinski wrote a lengthy and scathing dissent.116 This case
involved the Plaintiff Vanna White, known for being the hostess of “Wheel of Fortune” and the
Defendants Samsung Electronics America, Inc. (Samsung) and David Deutsch Associates, Inc.
(Deutsch) Samsung ran some advertisements which Deutsch prepared.117 The advertisements all
followed a similar theme of playing on outrageous hypothetical future outcomes for certain current
items from popular culture, the one in question involved Samsung’s video-cassette recorders
(VCRs).118 Unable to get Vanna White’s permission, they went ahead and ran a commercial using
a robot look-alike of Vanna White.119 The robot resembled White; was dressed up complete with
a wig (blond hair), a gown, and jewelry set in front of a game board which closely resembled
“Wheel of Fortune”.120 Samsung included the caption “Longest-running game show. 2012 A.D.”
– they were trying to convey that their products would still be around in the twenty-first century
in a humorous way.121 Vanna White had received no compensation for this usage and she gave no
consent. Bringing suit in California, White contended that the robot resembled her likeness.122
The case has left it unclear whether she has a publicity right in her role and how far
evocation can go.123 Also related is the unique issue of whether publicity rights should vest in
fictional characters or roles and not just the actual people portraying them.124 Ultimately, the court
held in favor of White. Even if the case was correctly decided, this case could be problematic for
evocation analysis; it will stretch the boundaries of what can be considered to evoke a celebrity to
dangerous levels. Justice Kozinski warned in his dissent “Instead of having an exclusive right in
her name, likeness, signature or voice, every famous person now has an exclusive right to anything
that reminds the viewer of her.”125 This case is arguably taking the field one step closer to granting
an absolute right of protection for anything under the sun that would evoke someone’s identity or
persona. An absolute right of protection would be dangerous and stifle the public domain, other
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opportunities for persona to be developed,126 and many other communicative and artistic human
endeavors. Overextending publicity rights to cover anything under the sun could lead to a slippery
slope and open a floodgate of litigation for intentional and accidental uses, many warn of the First
Amendment consequences flowing from such expansion of the right of publicity.127 A point of role
monopolization/scarcity/depletion could be reached in which lots of celebrities will be suing other
celebrities for infringing on their likeness or roles, or borrowed similarities, furthermore this could
become compounded by issues from survivability.
Dawn Dawson points out the fears of some including Justice Kozinski and Maddow that
placing into the hands of celebrities’ exclusive control of identity through the Right of Publicity
will impoverish the public domain and shift the balance against the public and in favor of
individuals.128 In White v. Samsung Justice Kozinski elaborates:
The First Amendment is . . . about protecting the free development of our national
culture. Parody, humor, irreverence are all vital components of the marketplace of
ideas. The last thing we need, the last thing the First Amendment will tolerate, is a
law that lets public figures keep people from mocking them, or from ‘evok[ing]’
their images in the mind of the public.129
Even Justice Alarcon – concurring and dissenting in part - said the only thing that would lead the
audience to think of White, was the imitation of the “Wheel of Fortune” set, and that “blond hair”,
a “gown”, and “jewelry” are attributes shared by many women and common among other game
show hostesses.130 Under this kind of reasoning, just change a few of the artistic and expressive
elements in this or any advertisement, even just one, and it could impact the outcome. To entertain
this line of inquiry for a moment, perhaps a fine line is indeed being danced around and trodden
on behind the scenes; soon the courts may be assuming the roles of art critics and publicity right
owners assuming the roles of censorship kings. Parody and mockery form an important safety
valve for society.131
The subjectivity, interchangeability, fluidity, and association garnering aspects of identity
may also pose problems for evocation analysis. People and identity can change over time and
indeed celebrities and individuals change their names, change their appearance and even their roles
and the things that the public associates with celebrities may change over time.
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D. Requiring Permission for Free Speech and Encouraging Expressive and Stylistic
Confinement
There is some pushback and criticism against the transformative use test in some of its
more recent applications emerging from the chaos left by Zacchini. For instance, Keller v. Elec.
Arts Inc. and Hart v. Elec. Arts Inc. in which college athletes sued EA for using their likeness in
video games through the use of digital avatars.132 Thomas Kadri raises some interest arguments
and criticism including that artists should not be confined in their expressive tools to just parody
and satire, but should be allowed to use “alternative means” such as realism to depict the content
of their work but currently under the transformative use test, an artist is forced to obtain permission.
133
For example, if a video game company like EA wants to make a video game of the football
players, it would have to approach several thousand athletes in NCAA division I football and
request a license.134 Every athlete would have the power to refuse to be part of the work, or could
condition his inclusion on distorting reality in his favor.135

1. Imitation of the Human Voice
A person’s voice can be the sole thing necessary to identify or evoke a person’s identity.
Midler v. Ford Motor Co. created a tort for misappropriating a singer’s voice, the three elements
of a Midler tort are deliberate misappropriation of 1) a voice that is 2) distinctive, and 3) widely
known.136 The car company Ford in conjunction with Young and Rubicam, wanted to run a
commercial advertisement with a recording of Bette Midler singing the song “Do You Want To
Dance” but she refused permission through her agent.137 They decided to go ahead and ended up
hiring her backup singer to do the commercial instead and told her backup singer to “sound as
much as possible like the Bette Midler record.”138 The appellate court reversed the district court
and found in favor of Midler – that her voice was protected against unauthorized uses that are
without permission or consent.139 Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc. similarly involved a sound-alike used
in an advertising campaign against the artist’s wishes.140
These cases are not about infringing of copyright in a musical composition - rather they
are about imitating the distinctive voice which is not the same thing as imitating style. The Ninth
Circuit in Midler v. Ford noted that “[m]ere imitation of a recorded performance would not
constitute a copyright infringement even where one performer deliberately sets out to simulate
another’s performance as exactly as possible.”141 Style is “how the music is delivered, how the
132
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words of a song are expressed. Style includes mood, phrasing, and timing. . . . Style is not subject
to ownership.”142 Voice is about identity and is as personal, individual, and distinctive as each
person’s face.143 Imitation does not necessarily condemn the work to liability, what’s critical is
whether the audience is under the belief or illusion that it’s actually the singer in question
performing the work and not an imitator. In a sense, this could be nearly analogous to
impersonation or high jacking of another’s voice; “To impersonate her voice is to pirate her
identity.”144 Thus there is a somewhat ambiguous and unresolved clash between misappropriating
the embodiment of one’s identity through their voice and mere musical imitation of their voice.
The distinction and framework for distinguishing between hijacking one’s voice and merely
imitating it, is left vague although some aspects can clearly be ruled out including literally copying
musical style. Vocal misappropriation must include to a large extent imitation of one’s voice, but
misappropriation must also involve something more and something worse than mere imitation,
and this something more is where much of the ambiguity lies. To put it another way, courts are
being asked to draw the lines between mere imitation in the sense of borrowing musical elements
from another’s voice versus vocal imitation crossing the threshold borrowing and outright stealing
one’s identity, and minus any demonstrable intent as was clear in these cases, these are very hard
lines to draw because it is art and music and subjectivity that is involved.

2. Facial Indicia and Photographs
One day, in the not so far future, issues relating to facial indicia could literally blow up in
our faces. What could be more uniquely identifying and intimately belonging to a person’s identity
as a human than their own face? The court in Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. said that “[I]f a
man’s name be his own property . . . it is difficult to understand why the peculiar cast of one’s
features is not also one’s property, and why its pecuniary value, if it has one, does not belong to
its owner, rather than to the person seeking to make an unauthorized use of it.”145 But with the
advent of technology, digital avatars, and morphing techniques for instance, will it be possible
perhaps even desirable to secure property in one’s peculiar and pecuniary facial features?
Also, with technological increase, the walls between people’s private and public lives are
breaking down. If a person’s photo is taken in a public place, then the first three privacy torts that
Dean Prosser lays out, are not actually applicable, however the fourth one which became publicity
rights may save face here one day.146 Of course much will depend on how the photo is used.
Currently publicity law cannot help as there is typically little to no commercial value for most
normal people who are non-public figures and non-celebrities, though perhaps arguments about
aggregate value could be made in the context of class action. Generally, once it’s out there in the
public sphere whether it’s a public beach or shopping mall, barring any reasonable expectations of
privacy or demonstration of injury, exploitation or false light etc., its fair game. But there are
proposals going forward including tort reform, contractually vesting ownership of the photo with
142
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the subject so that the photographer must bargain for its use, and congressional intervention and
regulation to provide people with an opt-out from companies that provide facial indexing and
search services.147 There are certainly privacy concerns at stake, but there are also First
Amendment concerns including the free flow of information, social and artistic commentary which
could be impeded if too much control is concentrated on restricting the ability to disseminate
photographs. These must be balanced.
Consider the case Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., in which Los Angeles Magazine
(“LAM”) published photographs of actors some deceased some still living, wearing Spring 1997
fashions by using computer technology to alter famous film stills.148 LAM artists used a famous
still photo from the film “Tootsie” in which Dustin Hoffman who was portraying a male actor
dressing the part of a woman in order to get a part on a television soap opera, wore a “long-sleeved
sequined evening dress and high heels, then replaced his body with the image of a male model
wearing a different evening dress and high heels.149 His head remained as in the original, however
now his body was replaced by “a male model in the same pose, wearing a spaghetti-strapped,
cream-colored, silk evening dress and high-heeled sandals.”150 While the district court ruled this
an exploitative commercial use, the Ninth Circuit reversed and held this to be not commercial
speech and under First Amendment Protection as there was no showing of malice.151 The Ninth
Circuit found this to be a “combination of fashion photography, humor, and visual and verbal
editorial comment on classic films and famous actors” and not pure commercial speech; any
commercial aspects here were found to be “inextricably entwined” with the expressive elements.152

E. Creating a Federal Right of Publicity is One Potential Avenue to Smooth out the Friction
Perhaps the field is due a major overhaul, some have proposed moving toward a single
federal right of publicity as one possible solution to end the uncertainty.153 This would have the
potential to create a baseline and standard against which state common law could even balance or
enhance. There exists great potential to make the system more stable, predictable, uniform, less
arbitrary, and less full of inconsistent tests for the courts to pick through. However, advocates for
a new more unitary federal right of publicity should consider how to counter any drawbacks of
such a system including the loss of flexibility and options that comes with a buffet of tests which
arise to deal with situations that may not necessarily fit into neat categories. One single federal
right of publicity may not truly solve the problem any more than the existing tests if the underlying
friction is not properly balanced and if there is still substantive vagueness within this new federal
right of publicity. After all, the existing tests came about for a reason. Many of the problems giving
rise to inconsistencies in publicity rights operate along different contexts that may not necessarily
mesh. Furthermore, First Amendment law is full of so many tests precisely because it deals with
147
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multifaceted issues that are at times disparate, and at other times overlapping. 154 Moreover, an
approach with one single test may hold good potential but alone may not be sufficient to solve this
riddle. Perhaps merging the existing tests together and using a sorting of the wheat from the chaff
kind of approach whereby only the best qualities of the existing tests are kept, and the ambiguities
or weaknesses are worked out, could bring things one step closer to developing a workable one
test federal right of publicity solution.

IV. CONCLUSION
Fundamentally, the Right of Publicity grants an exclusive right of property ownership in
one’s image, name or likeness; and the ability to gain, benefit, or use that property whether it is
through direct control, or licensing, or assigning away one’s rights. This would apply whether it’s
a widely-recognized celebrity or the most private individual even though these rights have
developed primarily to protect the property rights of those of renown. However, any right that is
granted in this arena is going to come at the cost of another’s rights in free speech or expression.
There can be both good and bad dimensions to this. There are clearly many instances where
appropriation of identity is harmful and wrong particularly concerning commercial exploitation.
There is strong grounding for preventing, deterring, and punishing such harmful uses. Invading
and exploiting one’s identity is still wrong even without profit as the primary motive. Through all
potential scenarios, a careful balancing must be made to appropriately narrow publicity protection
where First Amendment Freedoms are warranted or worthy of more protection than the Rights
vested in Publicity. The current practice in this area is unsettled and still under development with
a few prominent tests emerging. The outer limits are under defined. Currently the field could use
an overhaul and one possible solution is the creation of a federal statute, but more importantly the
law must be crafted with a keen eye to balance the friction between First Amendment Freedoms
and Publicity Rights.
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issue.
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